

GURTOV: Despite the best efforts of our government to make it appear otherwise, the Vietnam war remains the most urgent foreign policy problem of the United States and the most corrosive influence on our domestic life.

Thousands of lives -- American, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Lao -- are being lost every week in a war whose legitimacy few Americans now seem to uphold.

The times demand extraordinary action if the policies of the United States are to change and finally embrace termination of American involvement in Indochina as our overriding and essential objective.

All of us should be grateful that a man has responded, at personal risk to his future freedom, in order that the people may know the full extent of our tragic involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1968.

The divulgence of the classified documents concerning U.S. decision-making on the war, and the decision of the major newspapers to publish them, are a national service in the highest traditions of patriotism.

The significance of the so-called Pentagon Papers goes well beyond history.

They draw the attention of persons inside and outside the administration to the disturbing parallels between past and present.

I refer not merely to the Nixon administration's pursuit of policies which, like those of preceding administrations, are in my judgment infeasible, unwise, and in some cases immoral and reckless.

Of greater concern to me is the continuation of a pattern of deception in American policy -- deception of the Congress and the American people.

The truth about U.S. objectives and activities in Indochina is being distorted or hidden as much now as before, and this circumstance is as intolerable as the policies themselves.

The public record of the Nixon administration by itself provides an adequate basis for reaching this conclusion. The record shows that, like previous administrations:

1. This administration aims at achieving a military victory in Vietnam while professing to be striving for complete withdrawal. The gradual reductions of U.S. ground forces should not divert attention from the expansion and intensification of U.S. air power throughout Indochina, the creation of a new commitment to the survival of a non-Communist regime in Cambodia, and the support, in contravention of the law (the Fulbright amendment), of South Vietnamese and Thai intervention in Laos.

2. This administration is not interested in negotiations to end American involvement except on terms that it knows North Vietnam cannot accept.

Calls for mutual troop withdrawals and cease-fires are not meaningful offers to bargain; the administration surely knows in advance that such proposals, because of the conditions attached to them, will never be acceptable to the other side.

3. This administration, while paying lip service to self-determination in South Vietnam, continues to prop up a regime that is taking steps to prevent the holding of competitive elections and the evolution of political accommodations among the contending Vietnamese factions.

4. This administration, while expressing concern for the safety and liberation of U.S. prisoners in North Vietnam, is in fact exploiting their captivity for domestic political purposes.

The increasing number of POW's in North Vietnam's camps enables the administration to rationalize the long-term presence of U.S. forces in Indochina and the necessity of escalation in North Vietnam.

The administration knows full well that the POW's will not be returned unless and until the United States sets a specific date for complete withdrawal from Vietnam.

5. This administration has willfully misled the American people to believe that its policies are consistently intended to extricate the United States from the war.

It portrays escalation as de-escalation and failure as success.

Intervention in Cambodia was not a response to a new threat from the sanctuaries but was a U.S.-ARVN initiative to exploit the overthrow of Sihanouk.

The widespread use of air power in Cambodia is not designed to speed our troop withdrawals but to support ARVN intervention and to sustain a militarily ineffective, unstable government.

"Protective reaction" strikes against North Vietnam are in fact attempts to punish Hanoi for continuing the war; they may also be warnings to Hanoi of U.S. willingness to restart the air war. Finally, the incursions in Laos did not demonstrate the to ARVN's improvement but showed, /the contrary, that "Vietnamization" cannot be carried out without heavy U.S. air and logistical support, and cannot succeed even with it.

6. This administration's "Vietnamization" policy is primarily a domestic political tactic, not a program for complete withdrawal.

Troop reductions are being geared to have maximum impact on the 1972 elections; they have far less to do with ARVN's performance.

Moreover, such reductions are meant to distract attention from an unprecedented application of aerial destructiveness that promises not only increasing suffering for the people of the three countries, but also more American prisoners of war.

When a government consistently deceives its people about the purposes of its policies, it must be called to account.

The leaders of previous administrations are now being judged by the people as the result of publication of the Pentagon Papers.

The fullest divulgence of the truth about present U.S. policies in Indochina can only come, however, when the public and the Congress demand it.

The public should insist that their representatives press the administration to report the extent and purpose of American bombing in northern and southern Laos, and the nature and objectives of U.S. support for South Vietnamese and Thai intervention in Laos and Cambodia.

The Congress should enact legislation to overhaul the system governing classified documents. Such legislation might establish a panel of individuals outside the government to monitor and recommend the rapid declassification of non-current materials; and it might set up a system to assure automatic receipt of government studies by the relevant Congressional committees.

But the most urgent business of the American people and the Congress is to work for the removal of the United States from the war in Indochina.

The administration must be persuaded to set a definite date for terminating U.S. involvement in return for the release of our prisoners and the unimpeded withdrawal of U.S. forces and bases from South Vietnam.

Such an arrangement is clearly obtainable; and public and Congressional pressure to secure it would constitute an appropriate and effective response to nearly twenty years of deceitful and fruitless government policy-making on Indochina.

FREDRICK: Like many American citizens, I am deeply concerned about the extent to which the administration and the media have attempted to gloss over the real messages of the Pentagon Papers by focusing attention on issues only peripherally related to the central questions raised by the documents.

I believe these diversions reflect a conscious effort on the part of the administration and the media to save face now that their past records have been exposed.

Even more serious, however, I believe that these diversions reflect a conscious effort to insure that we, the American public, will not see the critical link between the lies of the past and those of the present -- and the future.

In this regard, two points merit particular attention:

1. For twenty-five years, the U.S. government has not only been waging a war of destruction against the people of Indochina; through its influence over and manipulation of information related to U.S. policies and presence in Southeast Asia, it has also been waging a propaganda war against its own citizens.

This information war -- reinforced by strong elements of racism within this country -- has led to the dehumanization of the people and the culture of Vietnam in the eyes of the American public. It has also thereby conditioned our attitudes about U.S. foreign policy.

We do not see any evidence at this time to suggest that the present administration has decided to change this policy of propagandizing the American people.

Indeed, all evidence seems to point to the contrary. We might cite the administration's current attempts to downplay and even ignore the significance of the PRG's 7-point peace proposal of July 1, and of our government's efforts to hide from us the truth about the current political situation in Saigon as two very relevant examples.

Secondly, as the Pentagon Papers so clearly demonstrate, U. S. involvement in Indochina was neither accidental nor altruistic.

Rather U.S. policymakers were the willing heirs to French colonial policy -- a policy which depended on a program of "divide to rule" and of "Vietnamization" to impose and maintain its influence over an unwilling people -- just as does U.S. policy today.

The U.S., unlike the French, has not established an outright colonial regime in Saigon. Rather, we have attempted to rely on so-called "nationalist alternatives" as the most effective means of maintaining our influence in that country -- and thereby have ended up supporting the most un-nationalistic regimes of all: Diem and Khanh in the 1950s and 1960s, Thieu-Khiem today -- and tomorrow undoubtedly others of the same "nationalist" ilk, others who also during the Vietnamese war for independence from the French, fought against their own Vietnamese brothers and sisters on the side of the colonialists.

We see no evidence of a change in these policies under the present administration. Rather, the basic assumptions which

have determined U.S. policy in Indochina all these years seem more clearly influential today than ever.

RUSSO: When I was invited to participate today, I hesitated somewhat, because I am currently involved in litigation concerning the Pentagon Papers.

I have been sentenced to jail for refusing to testify before a Grand Jury, but after giving it some thought, I decided that I would come, because I think that one of the most important issues is really not touched by the Pentagon Papers.

As Mr. Long has pointed out, the Pentagon Papers say very little about the Vietnamese people, and in this war, we have in addition to the 45,000 Americans who died there, the many thousands more who are maimed, who have come home having lost their legs, their arms, their eyes, addicted to heroin; in addition to that, by very conservative estimates I have made in my studies of the war, the United States has been responsible for the death of between 500 thousand and one million Vietnamese.

In addition to that, there are of course Vietnamese who have been maimed, and whose lives have been effectively destroyed.

Virtually half the country has been driven to take refuge. This I think points up the fact that the United States did not learn anything from World War II.

In Vietnam we have conducted a genocidal war, and we have done our best to depersonalize the Vietnamese people, and I think that is perhaps the greatest sin of all.

The United States has always ignored the problems and

the realities of Vietnam, as it is now ignoring the problems and realities of our own situation here at home.

Vietnam to me is a reflection of that part of the American character which promotes social injustice here at home. I think that in addition, present policy with regard to Vietnam rests on as many lies and as much deceit as we see in the Pentagon Papers. The issue of Vietnamization, for example, is one of the biggest, or one of the most misleading kinds of things I think the present administration could come out with.

The Vietnamese Army, that is the Saigon Army, as long ago as 1954, seemed to be in very much the same shape as it is in today.

The Americans were saying then, give us a little more time, we will get things in shape, we will have the Air Force ready, and in just another year we will be organized.

Now, that was 17 years ago, and the Saigon Army has not progressed.

I think a great deal depends, in this situation, on motivation. The Saigon Army has no motivation other than to feather its own nest, that is, the elite of the Saigon Army feathering their own nest.

There is here the whole issue of Vietnamization, which I think is a blatant set of lies and deception.

The issue of our POW's in North Vietnam is -- I think -- very similar.

I am as concerned as anyone for Americans who have been held captive by the North Vietnamese; however, making them a pawn in this situation, I think, is the ultimate in hypocrisy.

I spent eighteen months in Vietnam interviewing Viet Cong prisoners in the jails of South Vietnam, and I learned a great deal.

I learned when I went to the jail that the jail keeper did not even have a list of those who were in the jail.

Not only that, but the prisoners were treated in a very inhumane fashion.

They were tortured, and at times they were summarily executed.

This to me is the ultimate in hypocrisy.

We make demands for lists and ask for information; we demand all of the information about the prisoners that are held in North Vietnam; however, even at the jails in South Vietnam, the jail keeper does not have a list of the names of the people who are being held there.

I think that the United States' involvement in Vietnam has been disastrous on all counts -- politically, socially, economically.

Politically the United States has incurred the world image of the absolutist bully.

By resorting to the destruction of the rural environment in order to deny the Viet Cong support -- because they found they could fight them in no other way in this political war -- they had to resort to a destruction of the very environment within which

the people lived. And by so doing, the United States has opened herself up to charges of genocide and imperialism.

I think The Encyclopedia Britannica defines imperialism as the instance in which one country tries to control people outside of its own borders. I do not think that anybody can deny that is what the United States has attempted to do.

The determination of the Executive branch, through a number of administrations, to pursue, and even escalate, an undeclared war has set America into a drift towards absolutism, and her domestic unity and her foreign policy consensus has begun to crumble, and American youth are rebelling.

GURTOV: I would say that the administration has learned one thing from all of these years of American involvement, and that is how to pursue the same objectives as previous administrations, but knowing how to package them better.

I think Vietnamization is a classic example and certainly today the most important kind of new sales pitch that the administration has come up with to pursue the same goal as before, of preserving a non-Communist independent Vietnam, free from "external" influence. But by doing so in a number of different ways so as to disguise the fact it is pursuing those objectives, in terms of the impact on domestic opinion, which is terribly important, and which the administration clearly recognizes, the administration has gradually substituted air power for American ground power in order to reduce American casualties. That is an example of packaging.

Of course, the hope of the administration is that fewer American casualties will satisfy the American people, who will then ignore the fact that there is an increasing number of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, who are being killed, maimed, or losing their property.

Another example, I think, is the recent response of the United States government to the peace proposal in Paris.

It is interesting that after so many months of many hints of what the other side would give in return for our setting a firm timetable for withdrawal, the NLF and the North Vietnamese came out with a very clear statement, which indicated that this was in fact the trade-off that would come about -- prisoners for a timetable.

The administration found this very embarrassing, and its main response was not to consider what we should bargain for, and it was not to open up serious negotiations with the other side.

The question asked was: how do we package our rejection? And the way they packaged it was, first, by having the State Department say this proposal is interesting, but very complex and contains a number of ambiguities. Then finally, the order was given to Ambassador Bruce in Paris that he should pursue the matter with the other side, but, of course, in secret so that our refusal would not become public, and, therefore, become embarrassing.

Through these and other tactics, the administration is showing that the important thing about our Vietnam experience is really that you have to learn how to manipulate public opinion and the press and the Congress much better than previous administrations have.

RUSSO: The effect of the publication of the Pentagon Papers is that it has opened the eyes of the American public. I agree with Mr. Gurto in that I think it has had no effect on the Nixon administration besides indicating to them that they are going to have to become a lot sharper with their public relations. By that I think I mean that the administration has not changed. I think its policy is still based on lies and deceit, and I think that it is probably looking for ways to be even more deceptive.

BRANFMAN: I would like to say briefly what has gone on since the Nixon administration took office. When Nixon took over, the bombing in North Vietnam stopped, Cambodia was in peace and the bombing of Laos was relatively moderate.

Since then, we have had the invasion of Cambodia and massive bombings in that country. We have doubled the bombing of Laos and we have resumed the bombing of North Vietnam, twice a week since the first of the year.

More relevant, I think, coming from Laos what struck me most was that while we are de-escalating Vietnam in terms of manpower, we are actually building up in terms of American manpower in Laos. There are more Americans directing military operations in

Laos, and over a million dollars have gone for American personnel in the last year.

Since the publication of the Pentagon Papers, we have had an invasion of Cambodia, and a military offensive against the Plain of Jars. So I think that there is no doubt that the war is not winding down.

The Pentagon Papers have had very little effect on the Executive determination to continue the war, which leads to the question of the problem of the system or the way it works. I would tend to say the problem is the system in the sense that I think what has gone on here, since the end of World War II, is that there has been a proliferation of technology which by its nature means more and more power. It is being centralized and used in the Executive branch. There is not very much hope in curtailing this power in the Congress, because I think most Congressmen basically agree with what is going on, and those who do not are often silent.

But I think a third factor, which is a key, and which is something that can be done is that those Congressmen who do oppose the war, but do not have the knowledge and do not have the facts, should go to the American public and bring this out. This is especially important now that we have an automated air war with almost no information getting out about it.

MIRSKY: We stand now, in my judgment, at a pivotal point. There are very few choices that remain for the policy makers of the United States. We can get out of Indochina forthwith; we can further escalate from Cambodia to Laos to North Vietnam; we can employ nuclear weapons; and it is still possible that we can directly challenge Peking.

Suppose we choose not to leave the Indochina scene at once. Why do I believe that escalation is the inevitable course? Let us examine the case of Laos. Why was this operation guaranteed to fail?

The entire invasion route was heavily fortified by the North Vietnamese who smashed the ARVN on the ground and shot more than 250 U.S. helicopters from the sky. We know from CIA reports that 30,000 Viet Cong had infiltrated the Saigon government to the highest levels, so it is no surprise that some kind of advance preparations were made.

The military failure in Laos can not, of course, alter the situation in that Kingdom which is already half dominated by the Pathet Lao. It can only weaken yet further the standing of the unsteady so-called "neutralist" Lao regime which explicitly asked the United States not to invade.

Nor has the Laos defeat done anything to strengthen Washington's allies in Cambodia where, since the 1969 May invasion, most of that country has fallen under the control of our adversaries.

In both Laos and Cambodia, as in South Vietnam, and this is the central point that I want to make, the populations tend to support our opponents because they protect the local people from American military operations.

"Our" Indochinese desert because they view themselves as fighting for foreigners, while by now our opponents are widely regarded as patriots.

Can we call again upon the shattered ARVN to do our dying for us? Is this Vietnamization? Shall we kill five or six thousand more ARVN troops to save American lives? In the words of Ambassador Bunker, did we only change the color of the corpses by invading two countries, and bombing three, to protect our President's credibility in a fourth?

The President is now facing a crisis. His conventional military means prove ineffective. (The word "conventional," of course, has to be used only in the American sense.) The ARVN won't fight and may mutiny.

Last year U.S. soldiers, reluctant to fight an ambiguous war, increasingly turned to drugs, refused orders, and even killed scores of their officers.

Shall we then, unable to achieve an end that we should never have desired, destroy the ancient cultures and peoples of Indochina because we cannot win their hearts and minds? Are their bodies so cheap?

The Senate Subcommittee on Refugees has recently stated: "In this year, 1971, more civilians are being killed and wounded in the three countries of Indochina and many more made refugees than at any time in history. Most of the casualties are caused, and people made refugees, by American and allied military activities."

Such melancholy assessments must cast doubt on the assertion that "the war is winding down," which is the present big lie. Four million South Vietnamese, one million Cambodians, and at least 600,000 Lao are refugees, the survivors of the more than a million civilians

killed by our bombing, our harassment and interdiction, our Phoenix assassination program which has claimed 20,000 lives, and our search and destroy policy. These people all bear witness to the failure of our vision and our intention in Indochina.

They exceed in number, but not in value, the 50,000 dead and 300,000 wounded Americans. The big question: Why have we allowed this to happen? I think it is because we have two standards of morality -- one for ourselves and ^{our} for/communities, and one for far away.

We normally won't stand for murder, torture, and assault at home. We feel that inside ourselves, although we also know that many of us are potentially murderers, torturers and assaulters.

But, because we are potential murderers, torturers and assaulters, we are willing to entrust such acts to others at a distance. As long as the policy makers are willing to cloak our murder and torture in terms such as national defense, patriotism, obligation, and even responsibility, we allow the blood to continue to flow.

At the same time, every person in this room knows it is happening and he or she knows it is wrong.

The strain of the two standards, one for ourselves and another for far away, is tearing decent people in this country apart. A few weeks ago, in an address at Dartmouth, General Telford Taylor, one of the prosecutors at Nuremberg, after admitting that war crimes are being committed and that high officials may be responsible, warned the Dartmouth audience that our body politic can not stand an

investigation of the origins of American bestiality in Southeast Asia.

I think, on the contrary, that it has to stand that kind of investigation. When we face what we are, what we sometimes like to do, what we hide by letting others do it, we will be making a turn towards sanity.

Such an analysis will be agonizing for all of us, but without it, the numbness which we can all feel as it creeps inside us, will reach our hearts.

LONG: From the Pentagon Papers we have learned that because of total disregard for Vietnamese history, the United States has inflicted unprecedented suffering on a people whose only crime is their desire to be independent and to bring social justice to their country.

We have learned that the total lack of attention to human suffering on the part of the U.S. policy makers has made the United States use the most modern and most atrocious means to conduct this war against/innocent people of Indochina, thereby making it totally unacceptable for these people to reconcile themselves with the United States in any way short of the total withdrawal of all U.S. and other foreign troops from their countries.

The question, therefore, is how the American people and Congress can put pressure on the Nixon administration to end this senseless war. One way to do this is to address ourselves to the central issues, to inform the American public that the administration does not want to end the war.

To this end, one of the things that the Congress and informed individuals can do at the present time is to point out that the seven point peace proposal by the other side, in effect, meets every assertion that the Nixon administration, as well as the previous administrations, has made; and that failure on the part of the Nixon administration to come to any meaningful discussion based on the seven point peace proposal, in effect, reflects nothing but its desire to seek a military victory or the total destruction of the Indochinese people.

Another thing that American people and the Congress can do is to point out that the next election in Vietnam is an attempt by the United States to continue the war in Vietnam even if General Minh were elected. Everybody knows that General Minh was a collaborator with the French and had been most willing to cooperate with the United States in the early sixties.

Everybody knows that on December 25, 1970, Big Minh declared publicly in Saigon, "Whatever I do will be constitutional. I won't do anything that is unconstitutional." Since the constitution of South Vietnam was drafted with the help of Americans and since it officially outlaws the National Liberation Front, by having Big Minh elected on the peace ticket and then having him ask for continued American support the American government can score a propaganda coup against the American peace movement and clear the way for continued intervention in Vietnamese affairs.

LUCE: I don't think the war is winding down at all. I think the tactics are changing. That is, we are changing from a ground troop war to an air war. Certainly if you are a villager in Vietnam this doesn't make you feel any better because the villages are being bombed. When the village is bombed, more people are killed than when troops go through a village.

I see primarily a change in tactics rather than a war winding down. I see a change in American economic aid. For example, last year we gave \$21 million to the Saigon police force. This year we have increased it to \$30 million.

Last year we gave \$6.1 million to the whole education system. This year we have decreased this contribution to \$4.5 million, so that tactically we are changing from a ground war to an air war. In terms of our economic aid, we are changing our aid and giving more and more emphasis to military power.

We are now spending more than six times as much of our aid on the police work as we are on the whole education system. The war is not winding down.

I also think that one of the things we forget sometimes -- in talking about the questions of the rules of war and the constitutional laws and all -- is that it is not only in the hidden papers like the Pentagon Papers that our government advocates and condones the violations, but also that our very top government officials are doing this publicly.

For example, I would refer you to a May 3/"Face the Nation"

,1970,

speech of Vice President Spiro Agnew in which he said that our purpose for going in and bombing was, among other things, to destroy a hospital complex. This is a direct violation of Article 19 of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of war wounded. So these things are done openly and I believe this has passed without any notice here in the United States.

ELLSBERG: By December of this year, the Congress of the United States will have been appropriating taxpayers' money to spend, in part, ^{to} supporting a war in Indochina for 25 years -- a quarter of a century.

Last May marked the 20th anniversary of the month in which the Executive asked Congress and Congress supplied funds for use directly in the war in Indochina. Each year then of these last 20 years, money ~~from the producers, friends and individuals of the Congress~~ has been appropriated by Congress for napalm, for hiring Vietnamese soldiers (initially to fight against their own independence), ^{and for} planes and other equipment in that war.

That means that a young man who was born in that month of May, 1950, would now, this year, be able to vote on these issues, even without the new voting regulations reducing the voting age.

But for each year of his life, his parents would have paid taxes, voted by the Congress, to support that war and for each of the last three years he would have faced a serious possibility of being drafted for service in that war, something which no Frenchman in the eight years of the French war, supported by us against the independence of Vietnam, ever had to face.

One Vietnamese who objected strongly during that first Indochina war to the use of American-produced and supplied napalm

against his countrymen who were fighting for their independence, was a patriot and a nationalist named Ngo Dinh Diem.

Later, thanks to us, he became the ruler and eventually the dictator of South Vietnam. In that role he asked for American napalm against his countrymen. He got it. He also, for the first time, asked America to supply defoliants and herbicides and Congress voted the money for that.

The taxpayers and Congress giveth. The Executive giveth and the Executive taketh away. When it came time to discard Ngo Dinh Diem, the signal given to the plotters in Vietnam of U.S. support for the coup in 1963 was that the Executive should suspend payment on the Commodity Import Program which supported their entire military budget:

Again, these were funds that had always been supplied by Congress. When the Executive did so in the fall of 1963, as the Pentagon Papers show, the coup plotters then benefited from the realization of every officer in the Vietnamese army that he faced a total loss of U.S. support for the military budget. That is, their salaries ^{and} to pay for their troops would be cut off unless they joined the coup opposing Diem. They did so. Diem was assassinated. This act of liberation of the Vietnamese people that we had supported so long was so popular that the man who led that coup is today widely recognized as the most popular and respected figure in the Vietnamese armed forces.

He is a man so politically significant that he/... run against the incumbent president, who benefits from all the advantages of U.S. support now, and would, in fact, be a sure winner this year in the campaign were it not for the fact that it is against U.S. policy that he should ^{win,} run. So his chances for ^{winning} running are, in fact, minimal.

*to editor:
will date of
this statement
be clear?
Should there
be an editor's
note on this?
Later draft
out, change
US/Japan
collusion?*

One more anniversary -- one that's almost the first. Last December, Congress was asked to vote upon a supplemental appropriation that would extend and support the use of American ^{firepower} ~~fighter~~ power in Cambodia as well as Laos.

You heard from Fred Branfman who knows as well as anyone that that ^{firepower} ~~fighter~~ power is not for the ^{benefit of the} ~~people~~ ^{if he's} of Laos. What is meant for the people of Cambodia -- where the population is little under seven million -- is over a million refugees since our invasion with the South Vietnamese in 1970. [Now about two million, according to the Kennedy Subcommittee on Refugees.]

Two Senators voted against that supplemental appropriation, Gore and Goodell, both lame ducks in part because they had incurred the hostility of the administration for their act^s of opposition to the war.

But that number of Congressmen was about the ~~right~~ proportion, the same proportion that had always opposed appropriation bills year after year.

We are honored by the presence of one of the two Senators -- Senator Gruening -- who voted against the Tonkin-Gulf resolution, particularly voted against its hasty passage, and what we now can see from the Pentagon Papers, its deceptively manipulated passage at that time.

Now this kind of a history that I have just given is one that I would say is in language that would have been recognized only three months ago as emotional, biased, fanatic, extreme. I know that because I know that I was called all of these things ^{when} if I said anything approaching this over the last couple of years since I first read the Pentagon Papers and began using those terms.

There are still columnists and politicians who will use those terms about a description of our Congressional involvement and what it has meant. But I take it as a sign, when I hear that, of someone who hasn't yet read the Pentagon Papers.

I know how hard it is to get anyone to read them. No one knows better than I. They are very dull. They are boring. They are numbing to read. I happen to think there is no substitute for reading very large portions of those papers. I would have to say, unfortunately, much larger than is available even now. There is a Bantam book, thanks to The New York Times, which does give citizens and Congressmen, and for that matter, uninformed people in the Pentagon, a chance to inform themselves in a far greater way than they ever have. I hope that the Congressmen will undertake to insure, and they have the power to do this, that the entire record is available -- not a selected part, not a small bit, but the entire 7,000 pages which for all its limitations is a massive beginning on the honest history of the war.

→ To editor: (will there be a note, here or elsewhere, on the Small edition and the G. P. O. edition: (either of which includes the 4 volumes on negotiations, which are in the hands of Congress).)

I think that measures to make that available to Congressional staff as well as to the Congressmen themselves and ultimately the public are very strongly to be hoped for. Nevertheless, this history does show very clearly that the Executive is on fairly strong grounds when it claims that it has had the supporting collaboration of Congress in waging this war over the last 20 years.

Many Congressmen have honorably spoken out strongly and truly about the war, but so long as they themselves -- and this is true of ^{most} many of them -- vote for the appropriations, they have given the President all that he needs from them to help wage the war.

They have given him ^{their} the collaboration and their cooperation and they are accomplices in the war, as each President has pointed out.

On the other hand, the responsibility of those lied to is not the same. It is not as great as the responsibility of those doing the lying. Even among those who have been deceived, ^{who} range in some degree from citizens to the President, the responsibilities aren't the same.

Among those lied to, as I say, there are differences of degree of responsibility correspondent to ^{and} ^{verying} ~~the~~ ^{their} power to have known ^{or} and found out the truth and the responsibility of citizens to ^{Congressmen have} used to the full their ^{The question must be faced, for example, whether} ~~use the power of the Constitution to find it out and inform them-~~ ^{all powers} selves.

to the ~~Hennigan Papers~~,
From now on, thanks even to the ~~Bantam~~ book that I hope
will ultimately be in the Record and which is available to the
Congress, any Congressman who remains ignorant of the data and
information in those studies takes on himself a very heavy in-
dividual responsibility for his own ignorance and his own decisions
that may follow from it.

The same is true for the administration, of course, for
day
each/that it persists in denying this information to the American
public. But supposing this responsibility -- to inform themselves --
is faced as it has not been in the past. What can anyone do about
it? Specifically, what can a Congressman do about it? They know
the details of what is open to them far better than I.

But I do want to suggest a standard by which Congressmen's
efforts can be judged. One thing weighing on the Congress this
year, as in the past, is the fact that if they ~~are to~~ use their
power to end the war, ~~what can Congress do about this war.~~ It ~~they~~
~~can end it, in a number of ways.~~

(that the President, as he
The inhibition against using that power has been, ~~as the~~
~~President~~ has made clear, ~~that he~~ will not share that responsibility
with them. To me, the meaning of the support for the McGovern-
Hatfield amendment and others, such as it has been, is that many
Congressmen are willing to share that responsibility for helping
to get the President out.

But, as I say, the President has made it clear they will have to fight ^{him, to get us out.} They will have to take all the responsibility.

Senator Stennis spoke for many Congressmen. He said what was on their minds. He warned his fellow Congressmen against a bill that would take upon Congress the sole responsibility for ending the war by ending appropriations and, thus, ^{take} the responsibility for any bad consequences that may follow.

God knows there is no guarantee that only good consequences will follow from that act either in this country or in Vietnam. So he urged his fellow Congressmen not to take upon themselves the recrimination that would follow from that responsibility.

That is humanly understandable, but to dodge that responsibility is to accept the responsibility for continuing the war. The standards, I think, by which a Congressman's willingness to fight the President ^{on this matter} ~~could be measured~~ ^{his efforts} ~~would be shown by~~ to cut off appropriations; to move where appropriate in terms of violations of international law and the Constitution towards impeachment of various officials who may be found unequivocally to have lied or to have mis-used their Constitutional power; or to file suits against these officials, as I am glad to see some Congressmen have done; ^{to obstruct Executive-desired legislation, appropriations, or appointment} ~~not only by adverse votes but by such means as filibuster if necessary, to obtain Executive compliance; and to support legislation to rescind the Constitutional~~ ^{A Congressman must be willing to risk the loss of votes;} ~~(P. Do not do such things,~~ he must be willing to risk the loss of financial support and bad columns in newspapers. He will certainly lose points within the club, as Senator Gravel did when he tried to inform the American role of Congress in the making of foreign policy and in war powers.

people of the contents of the Papers.

He will be embarrassed. He will be criticized and laughed at. Nothing is more ominous to a politician, I think. He may lose his job. Is it reasonable to ask him to take those risks in this case?

I think the standard that each individual and specifically Congressmen should take in judging whether they personally have done enough is set by two types of behavior that are familiar to all of us.

The first is the standard of the three million men who have answered the call of Congress and the Executive and risked their bodies and their lives in the paddies, jungles and cities of South Vietnam.

How many of them have paid for that willingness with their arms and their legs? That is a statistic, I understand, Congress has not yet been able to pry out of the Department of Defense, which apparently believes the American public has no need to know how many of their sons have suffered in that way.

But we do know that 55,000 have given their lives and hundreds rest in foreign prisons because they felt it was their responsibility to answer the demands of Congress and the President.

Secondly, there are several hundred prisoners of war in this country -- young men, who before they had ever heard of the Pentagon Papers, instinctively knew it was not right for them to go to war; that, in fact, it was their duty as Americans, as free responsible human beings, not to collaborate but to resist that

war; and they are in prison for it today while thousands of others are in jeopardy for that resistance.

At least one of them is known to many of the Congressional sponsors of this conference. His name is Vincent McGee and he used his last months while the Supreme Court was considering his case for draft resistance, to work for Business Executives' Move for Peace, working on the Hill to inform Congressmen and encourage them to resist the war. That is how they know him.

He got married while waiting for the Supreme Court decision a couple of months ago. He is now in Lewisburg Prison as of a few weeks ago on counts that include not having a draft card.

He took half of his draft card and burned it in April of 1967 and sent the other half to Lyndon Johnson. I asked him a month ago, while he was waiting to go to prison, why/had chosen that form of activity rather than simply using the electoral process; why he had dramatically chosen to expose himself to prison in order to express his deep moral conscientious feelings against the war.

He told me something very interesting. I asked him how old he was in 1967. He was 24 years old. I said, "That means you were 21 in 1964." He said, "Yes, that was the first year I voted. I voted for Lyndon Johnson as a candidate that would get us out of this war and would be for peace."

"The only President that I have ever known, that I have ever voted for is the man who told me that, and by 1967 it was clear to me that voting alone was not all that I could do nor all that I must do to end this war."

It is not all that those who know Vinnie McGee in Congress can do. I think the answer then to the question of what is one's responsibility and how ingenious and how resolute should one be in opposing the war is simply this:

What ^{could} you do to resist the war ^{if you were}, Are you willing to risk the loss of your job or your career or influence or access to power ^{for} people? No one here will be asked to give his life opposing the war, as you ^{your} brothers and sons have been asked or ^{perhaps} will be asked ^{perhaps} to give ⁱⁿ pursuing it.

That is not the issue ^{to} That is not the issue for me or any one here. But there are people here young ^{who} enough to have relatives ^{who} have chosen to go to jail in opposing it. When it comes to much lesser things like the embarrassment Senator Gravel experienced, I know that he felt that was well worth it and that he would feel a great deal more ^(trouble than that would be) was worth it.

Hence, I am speaking here in a real feeling of hope that Congressmen, like other citizens, when they have the information on which to make a responsible choice, will do that and will use their power to end this war.

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anyone here might have any information on that matter to clear that point up.

First, I don't know what was said to be sensitive. In Near versus Minnesota, it says the only thing that may possibly be subject to a prior restraint is that which is of the nature of giving information as to troop ship movements in time of war or the location of massing of troops and things of that description.

So it is very difficult for anyone to use the published Papers to determine whether this is true. And it is very difficult even for Congressmen who have access to the total Papers to know precisely what is referred to.

Perhaps Mr. Ellsberg could comment on whether or not any of these Papers do appear to be within the Near versus Minnesota exception. The court says they aren't, but we have no way presently to get any guidance, even if we have access to the full Papers, as to what these various items named by the Solicitor General as sensitive matters are.

I would like to know what they are, at least as something of a guide. I do have access to the Papers as a Member of Congress, but it is pretty difficult to search through many, many pages without any indication of what the government is pointing out as such sensitive material.

ELLSBERG: I sympathize with your problem because, to my knowledge, no page of it meets that criteria. I am not privy to what the government claimed these items were.

It is a question of what the Defense Department and the Justice Department claim is sensitive material, since, ^{I believe,} ~~in fact,~~ this claim was limited to two district court judges who ruled against it in their opinion.

But it would seem to me that Congress will have to make some decision on how to deal with these documents and when and how to make them available to the public. It should surely be interesting and it surely should be revealed what, in the government's opinion and the Executive's opinion, is sensitive material.

I read in the paper that Secretary Rogers had offered to give his opinion on this to the papers. I don't know whether they availed themselves of that but I should think the Congress should ask for that list.

ECKHARDT: I would like to know what was on those lists which were delivered in camera. I would be willing to accept it under any limitations or conditions because it seems to me that unless one knows what the list is, to merely riffle through thousands of pages of paper is a rather fruitless and difficult task in order to determine what our policy was with respect to classification.

ELLSBERG: Has Congress not asked the Executive for that permission?
information?

EDWARDS: We had a vote on the floor of the House that we lost. The vote was whether or not all of the volumes would be made available to all of us and we were voted down in the House of Representatives.

Then there is the question of the extent to which the military, during this period, came to dominate the diplomats? What do the Pentagon Papers show in that respect? It does appear that the military was dominating the diplomats during this period.

I think we really ought to explore all these questions. Perhaps, Dr. Ellsberg, you might address yourself to the question of whether or not there is any hope of building checks into the system.

ELLSBERG: I wouldn't put in a lot of checks, ^{my trust} provided that those within the Executive branch ^{in hopes that the Executive} will always remain responsive to the President's desires and the desires of Congress. ^{Congress has to use its power to assert its own} I have come ^{role,} to appreciate, in the last couple of months more than ever before, the wisdom of the signers of the Constitution in providing for parallel responsibilities and for some independence in various branches of government.

People ask whether, after all, people in the Executive are the only ones who can be corrupted by power or shirk responsibility. Obviously not. We are talking about a generation of behavior, very similar behavior by a large number of people and that, in itself, almost proves that it is not the character of any one person that is to be judged by the performance of a system, nor is it the kind of people that go into the Executive branch.

Such people as Nixon, Melvin Laird, Johnson, Truman and Kennedy all came from Congress. In fact, I saw in the papers that Richard Nixon protested strongly the holding by Truman of certain documents at that period.

These same people could have been relied on 20 years ago,

a little earlier in the cold war at least, to have opposed the kind of behavior that the Executive is foreseeably showing right now.

will to provide a check on the Executive

In other words, I think one has to address Congress ^{is} ~~in its~~ ~~relation to the Executive, as it~~ ^{the same} applies to the courts. But we are in the halls of Congress now and let's take it from there. Congress has, in effect, signed over its responsibilities under the Constitution ^{in the field of war and foreign policy,} for over 25 years, and I think you are exactly right as I heard you attribute it to the legacy of World War II.

The definition of the situation we are in as a cold war had very fateful consequences to the functioning of our constitutional system and our democracy. That is one of the ^{perceptions} ~~possessions~~ that all of these people share.

They had learned very vividly in the four years of our participation in World War II that our affairs in the world were to be conducted by the President. Congress virtually went to sleep. The courts abjured responsibility.

Citizens and Congress together were to accept measures of censorship, in effect, the concealing of information. To define the situation and encourage the analogy of the World War II struggle for survival against the powerful opponent seems to answer all these questions as to whether the Executive had the right to take over all this responsibility.

In a way, ~~the position that~~ I think Congress has to start ~~with is to~~ make the mental and emotional effort to escape from

the powers of these metaphors and analogies from World War II, from the experiences that shaped people like Richard Nixon, who was a junior officer in World War II, like so many others who see the world in those terms. *Congress must help us* and come back to peace, and tell the people of this country it is within our power to bring about *our relationship to the rest of* peace in the world.

It is not within our power to end all violence, *in the world*, but it is in our power to leave behind us the wartime distribution of power which puts all the responsibility and all power in the Executive.

ECKHARDT: I have a question I would like to ask Dr. Ellsberg. We have been discussing this question of information available to the people and Congress. Of course, assuming, as I do, once information is available to the press there should be almost no restraint.

Nevertheless, there is the other question as to what extent the Executive should retain material privately and for what period of time. In other words, I think there is a difference between the cat in the bag and the cat out of the bag.

I don't think many of us would say that we must know currently and absolutely and immediately the details of/foreign relations. Yet I think we would also agree that the retention of materials, particularly materials of the nature of which are more policy-making than details of matters on defense, should never have been held as long as the Pentagon Papers.

Is there some guideline as to where we should draw those

and under the view of the military that they know what's best for the country, we have developed horrendous national suicidal programs. It is precisely in strategic military planning -- in every element of it -- civilians should assume direct control of our national plans -- not just oversight but day-to-day participation in the planning. Specifically, there should be no strategic military planning carried on solely by military men.

Finally, because time is limited, as an immediate small step in the direction of de-militarizing the Pentagon, I recommend that our distinguished group of Congressmen urge the President to provide that all servicemen and women on duty in the Pentagon be taken out of uniform. You'd be pleasantly surprised to see how ordinary a four star general or admiral looks in civilian dress.

ELLSBERG: I have two thoughts. One, I am struck listening to you, Congressman Kowalski, because of your ^{striking} ~~striking~~ background. I was thinking over the various Presidents you were talking about earlier, the ones who ignored, by-passed, lied to and in general treated the Congress almost contemptuously.

These were the Presidents in war-time affairs, namely, Truman, Johnson, Kennedy and Nixon, who came from Congress. Whereas, the one who took Congress' role in these matters quite seriously, and in fact, let Congress impose what amounted to a veto -- an effective veto -- and kept us away from the disastrous possibility of going into North Vietnam was Eisenhower:listening, in part, to such people as Lyndon Johnson in the Congress.

The irony continues when one considers that he, in turn, had a military background, ~~which you speak of~~, and his skepticism was reserved for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which he kept trying to abolish and Congress kept saving them from him. He didn't trust them as an institution ~~very well~~ in the command process.

The question for Congressmen, it occurs to me, is what do you regard as the right of the Executive to lie directly to you?

Putting it the other way, what do you regard as your responsibilities to your constituents under the Constitution to do when an Executive official -- and we are not talking only of the President but also of the appointed officials under him -- comes before a Congressional committee and not only, on one hand, conceals information -- as clearly happened before the Cambodian invasion -- but lies about what happened, as in connection with the Cambodian invasion and the Laotian
the Son Tay raid?
invasion and ~~Sant Te Re~~?

I happened to be in Washington when Secretary Laird appeared before the Fulbright Committee for, I think, the *Son Tay raid.* second time, partly in connection with the ~~Sant Te Re~~. It is perfectly evident from the information that came out in the newspapers that Secretary Laird made untrue statements about what we had done in the outskirts of Hanoi in connection with that raid in firing rockets -- a wartime act against another country. The American people had to learn directly about that *have* from Hanoi Radio, which naturally at first didn't get a lot

of plausibility.

I happened to be in Washington and attended that hearing. I expected to hear the panel of Senators confronting him jump down his throat. Presumably he hadn't done it on his own initiative but still he had done it.

On the contrary, I think they were on the defensive in the exchange, if anything. This does happen again and again and I wonder why it is regarded as almost heresy to talk about impeachment as Representative McCloskey has.

Again, one doesn't have to start with the President. There are Secretaries of Defense, the Air Force and the Army, who, from time to time are in a position of deliberately misleading Congress.

We do have the case in Cambodia of the President telling the people in a public speech that the intelligence estimates indicated that North Vietnamese troops were massing for the purpose of going west into South Vietnam and endangering our troops.

That was an untrue statement later abandoned by the administration. Again, I heard almost no criticism from Congress. In short, Congress would seem always to act out this role of helplessness and lack of legitimate right and need to know, which I can't believe is serving their constituents well.

ECKHARDT: Frequently we don't know whether it is a lie or not because we don't know or it has been misrepresented until much later, but there is a current situation regarding

Mr. Raskin talks about the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At first when we introduced the legislation, we called it a peace agency. However, the name peace agency had to be changed to gain support in Congress. Mr. Kowalski was one of the original sponsors of that bill back in 1961 and 1962.

Let us see what the Pentagon Papers show regarding the need for internal checks and balances. I think it is an important question.

ELLSBERG: I can't entirely agree with the present pre-occupation with the question of institutional change and of changing the relations between Congress and the Executive.

I think that is needed, obviously, and I think the Pentagon Papers are relevant to the kinds of changes that are needed, and I hope ^{they} will contribute over a matter of years to changes like that by showing the urgency and the detailed kind of changes necessary.

But, that won't end the war as quickly as it must be ended. Institutional change, which will take years, I think, can not be relied upon. Nor, in fact, can presidential electoral politics be relied on to end this war or involvement in the war before we have carried certain recent policies, as in Cambodia and Laos, to their implied conclusion and destroyed North Vietnam.

So, I have thought for some time that it was essential to address the shorter run question. How do we bring the war to an end before Americans have adopted that policy of destroying North Vietnam?

As I look around at the elements of our society that might end it and could end it, I have to focus on Congress. Moreover, I have to focus on individual Congressmen doing "unconventional" things.

THE PRESS: Dr. Ellsberg, while you were at it with the various interesting Pentagon Papers, if you had the Gulf of Tonkin incident study, why didn't you release that also?

ELLSBERG: I did not.

THE PRESS: You never did have access to that?

ELLSBERG: I did have access to it. In fact, in 1964, during a study under Walter Rostow, an inter-agency study of crisis decision-making, I was the only civilian outside of the Weapons System Evaluation Group of IDA, which had done these crisis studies, to be given official access. I spent part of that year reading all of the crisis studies that were done ^{including} ~~in keeping~~ their command and control study.

That was a period when the Secretary of Defense did not have access to the study, nor did he have access to that study until Senator Fulbright asked him for it in 1968. His testimony ^{correctly} in 1968 shows he commented quite directly he had never heard of that study until a few days before Senator Fulbright had asked him for it. I am well aware he was telling the truth when he

said that.

THE PRESS: Having read the study, Dr. Ellsberg, what do you feel it tells us about the origin of the American escalation of the war?

ELLSBERG: The command and control study? It ^{doesn't} add a lot. Of course, when it was written it was in direct contradiction to many of the statements made by Secretary McNamara

before the Fulbright Committee and before Congress voted on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

This is one of the things I thought Congressman Eckhardt might be interested in. He raised the question, where does one draw the line on what is released and what isn't released, and there is an assumption that the line could not possibly or responsibly be drawn more liberally than the Pentagon Papers released indicate.

Now nothing in those, of course, is more recent than ~~two~~^{three} years ago. I would question whether that is the standard that one must go by. I think that most Congressmen have indicated that they feel it would not be possible, under any circumstances, to demand or receive material, for instance, on covert operations at the time or recently afterwards or on current operations.

Now I would certainly dispute that. President Kennedy's comments to The New York Times in, I guess, 1962, the year after the Bay of Pigs, were that he wished they had revealed, at the time, the covert operation of the Bay of Pigs.

~~That~~ ^{that} It is a presidential judgment, a very reasonable one, that the public would have been better served if Congress had ^{had} that information. When you mentioned the command and control study, the information behind that would have dealt with the so-called 34A operations against North Vietnam being conducted in the first half of 1964.

The fact that Congress was not told and indeed was entirely misled about the nature of those operations, played a crucial

role in manipulating Congress so as to get an appearance of support for a war about which, in fact, they had been grossly misled.

So, again, it would have been better for all of us had they had the information, which, in fact, Senator Morse appeared to have, but having it only by himself he was not able to convince his fellow Senators.

The information about covert operations in Laos in the past and now, information that Fred Branfman has brought to us, obviously is very long overdue. Finally, to get to the question of ongoing plans -- ongoing operations -- when will Congress decide that it has a need to know about the decision-making that went into the Cambodian invasion or the Laotian operation?

I put it as almost an exercise to people who have read these Papers or Congressmen who have access to the full set that one of the things they should strive to learn from them is a set of good hypotheses about how they are being misled, abused and manipulated today and in past years by studying how things like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution go through.

They should be able to make some good guesses as to what in went on/the process leading up to Cambodia or Laos. There is no question there was great deception in that process and I think it is time for Congressmen to decide that they have a right to know and a need to know. Indeed the public does deserve better

than leaked stories to Look Magazine of classified information from within the administration, ~~in a more comprehensive way.~~

They should have the memos, contingency plans and the estimates represented in the Pentagon Papers for those episodes. Finally, I think they should have some access, however limited, to the kinds of "contingency plans" that exist right now for the invasion of North Vietnam and the total bombing of North Vietnam.

HALPERIN: Let me say, I have never been in Vietnam. I don't speak Vietnamese and I don't purport to be an expert on Vietnam or Vietnamese society. I think there are two different notions of what the first priority is regarding the war.

It is clear that Vietnam has raised a number of very fundamental issues about the role of the United States in the world, about the nature of our interests in the world, about the degree to which we can ignore the rights and interests of other people to insure what has to be done for our own security, the questions about the morality of the war, the questions about the decision-making structures, the powers of Congress and so on.

What has disturbed me is not what some of the discussion is here but about some of the things that have been going on in the Congress. We seem to be turning our attention to what would seem to me quite legitimate post-war issues and post-war problems before we are out of Indochina.

Daniel Ellsberg's remarks from Chapter IV

based on the most likely possibilities in the Democratic Party, or anyone who may conceivably replace Mr. Nixon as a Republican candidate, is going to compel or lead any major turn-around in foreign policy perspective.

whom

Perhaps another answer is, nobody / we can come up with as a third-party candidate -- and of course I am not thinking of George Wallace either -- would be someone representative of real new political movement.

Perhaps such a person too is not of the kind that can release himself from the shackles of World War II thinking. Nevertheless, I am inclined to at least become much more interested in that alternative.

EDWARDS: I would like to ask Mr. Ellsberg if in addition to the Papers printed in The New York Times that there were some documents you wished they had published that they did not publish?

ELLSBERG: I felt for a couple of years there really is no substitute for having very large chunks of this available for the citizens and Congress to look at. I felt, from the beginning when I looked at this, it was not a question of a page here and a page there and a collection of sensational secrets.

In fact, I was asked by Members of Congress whether I could give them a list of some examples of some fairly dramatic points. I said, "It's not like that." What you have to be able to do is read enough of this in sequence to get, for example, a

feeling for what is not there at all.

When you see a document here, a document there, one can say that is not representative; that there must have been something more sensible, more humane, more concerned that month somewhere else in the files. And you really have to read about 3,000 to 5,000 pages before you begin to get a very strong sense of confidence, which accompanies the sinking feeling, that such things are not there.

That is the main answer to your question. Secondly, there are individual documents that, if I had been selecting, I would have put in, but I don't think that is of major importance. Everyone would choose differently.

However, as the journalists have limitations of space, it may be, I suppose, difficult to give a lot of space to the earliest periods. pages. I guess if there were two large chunks that I would like to see in print, one would be the entire sweep of intelligence estimates. I think The New York Times must have made a decision not to put any of those in verbatim, and to me, the most eye-opening and stunning aspect of the reading was to read how accurate the intelligence estimates ^{of} primarily CIA and State Department analysts had been over the years. That threw this question of presidential responsibility into a very sharp light and raised many pertinent questions.

The other chunk would be that which covered the 1945 to 1954 period, including the Geneva Conference. I think that reading ~~that~~ ^{than any other portions} had more effect _{on my own attitudes toward the war} and toward the legitimacy of our involvement.

So long as one is able to think of this as a civil war that one has wandered into for whatever reasons, one doesn't question the legitimacy and one thinks that the United States was simply adding to the burden of a war of the Vietnamese people that would be going on anyway.

To read the history from 1945 on -- in some detail -- is to have that attitude shattered; and that worked a very great change in my own thinking, not only about the war but about what the responsibilities were of an American citizen who ^{happened} ~~professed~~ to have this knowledge. So I hope that does come out.

DOW: Do you think, Dr. Ellsberg, that The Times had that data available from the 1945 to 1954 period?

ELLSBERG: From what they have published, they had it available.

I can understand the ^{reaction} ~~reaction~~ that a lot of people have ^{to} ~~to~~ going back that far.
In fact, I found over the last couple of years, even ~~now~~ talking to people who had fully authorized access to this, to get them to read ^{that} parts ^{the 1961} even a year or two earlier ~~was~~ was difficult because of the attitude that "that is past history and is no longer relevant."

I understand the attitude. I didn't read the earlier part myself until the very last. I went backwards in fact. What I found was that year by year my perception of the ~~work~~ war changed kaleidoscopically as I peeled off one year after another of American involvement.

When you get back to the 1945 and 1950 period, I found out that it's very stunning. I think that The New York Times felt that with the limited amount of space they had to concentrate on the more dramatic and more recent material. But I do hope that Congressmen and citizens will really take the effort to read that earlier part of the Papers.

RASKIN: I would like to say something again about the situation at the end of the Second World War and see where that brings us in terms of now.

The Pentagon Papers show us how a group of men undertake to manage an empire. They show how there was no end to which they wouldn't go to pursue their particular objectives so long as they were within the limits of attempting to avoid a nuclear war.

And indeed, from time to time, even that "option" seemed like something they were prepared to think seriously about implementing. What we have seen among our elite is a group of people active in the name of the society who arrogated much to themselves, pretty much going their own particular way without reference to anyone but their own clique.

They were interested in creating a reality: that of domination in Southeast Asia at whatever the cost. It is that